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ARTICLE
A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO
HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW
Justin Murray*
Harmless error review is profoundly important, but arguably broken, in the form that
courts currently employ it in criminal cases. One significant reason for this brokenness
lies in the dissonance between the reductionism of modern harmless error methodology
and the diverse normative ambitions of criminal procedure. Nearly all harmless error
rules used by courts today focus exclusively on whether the procedural error under
review affected the result of a judicial proceeding. I refer to these rules as "result-based
harmless error review." The singular preoccupation of result-based harmless error
review with the outputs of criminal processes stands in marked contrast with criminal
procedure's broader ethical vision, which also encompasses non-result-related interests
such as providing defendants with space for autonomous decisionmaking, enforcing
compliance with nondiscrimination norms, and making transparent the inner workings
of criminal justice.
The vast scholarship relating to result-based harmless error review, though deeply
critical of its current role in the administration of justice, has not put forward an
alternative method of harmless error review that courts might realistically consider
using. Commentators in this area have devoted much of their energy toward persuading
courts to exempt large swaths of criminal procedure from harmless error review entirely
and thus to require automatic reversal for errors involving exempted rules. Instead,
courts have done just the opposite by subjecting an ever-expanding list of errors to
harmless error review, and there is no reason to think this trend will abate in the
foreseeable future.
I attempt in this Article to chart a different course. My proposal, called "contextual
harmless error review," has two essential features. First, it would assess harm in
relation to the constellation of interests served by the particular procedural rule that was
infringed and would not, as under existing law, automatically confine the harmless error
inquiry to estimating the error's effect on the outcome. Second, contextual harmless
error review would examine whether the error harmed the interests identified in the first
step of the analysis to a degree substantial enough to justify reversal.
* Assistant Attorney General, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Consumer Fraud Bureau;
J.D. 20IO, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. 2007, Harvard University. I would like to
thank my former colleagues in the Appeals Division of the Public Defender Service for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, who taught me the better part of what I know about harmless error review and
criminal procedure. All views expressed, and in particular any mistakes made, are wholly my
own.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]he Court has been faithful to the belief that the harmless-error doctrine
is essential to preserve the "principle that the central purpose of a criminal
trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence,
and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the
underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable pres-
ence of immaterial error."
[T]he Court in pursuing the theme of guilt/innocence must beware lest a
dominant value become an exclusive one; lest a functional inquiry into a
right's consequences for accuracy crystallize a functionalist reduction of
the right's content.2
M odern criminal procedure is vast and complex - so much so thatsome degree of procedural error is virtually inevitable in all but
the most straightforward of criminal trials. Some errors are caught
and promptly rectified: the trial court might, for instance, initially give
the jury an erroneous instruction but immediately correct itself after
counsel brings the problem to its attention. Many errors, however, go
undetected until the only available remedial devices - within the con-
text of the criminal proceeding, at least - require courts to undo one
or more key outputs of the adjudicative process. The most familiar
remedy fitting this description is appellate reversal of the defendant's
conviction or sentence - a costly remedial option4 if we assume, as I
will for the sake of argument, that the conviction is correct on the mer-
its.5 Others include permitting the defendant to withdraw her plea,
dismissing the indictment, and, less commonly, reducing the defen-
dant's sentence. 6 For the sake of simplicity, but at the expense of
I Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (iggi) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 681 (1986) (citation omitted)).
2 Robert M. Cover & T Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1092 (1977).
See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973) ("[A] defendant is entitled to
a fair trial but not a perfect one,' for there are no perfect trials." (quoting Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123, '35 (1968) (alteration in original))).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1986) (emphasizing the social cost
of reversing factually supported convictions). But cf O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 443
(1995) (stating that, although the government has a "legitimate and important" interest in avoiding
retrial for individuals whose convictions were in fact unaffected by errors, this interest "is some-
what diminished . . . if one assumes . . . that retrial will often (or even sometimes) lead to
reconviction").
This assumption does not always hold true, of course, as proven by the recent spate of DNA
exonerations. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful
Conviction Law, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 35. I nevertheless accept it here, arguendo, to bring into fo-
cus a different set of problems associated with modern harmless error law.
6 Although American courts have been reluctant to reduce a defendant's sentence to rectify
errors unrelated to sentencing, Professor Sonja Starr has forcefully made the case that this reme-
dial option ought to be available in appropriate cases. See Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as
a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 GEO. L.J. 1509 (2009).
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technical precision, I use the term reversal as shorthand for all these
forms of relief.
This Article is about harmless error review - a set of closely relat-
ed remedial rules 7 that, taken together, arguably constitute reviewing
courts' "strongest shield against reversal." Although there are some
circumstances in which reviewing courts contemplating reversal need
not conduct harmless error review, those circumstances are exceedingly
rare.9 And when courts do perform harmless error analysis, they con-
clude that the error under review is harmless with remarkable fre-
quency.10 It is now well understood that harmless error review is a
7 Harmless error review is "best viewed as a question of the law of remedies" in that it deals
with "whether a particular form of relief - the reversal of a conviction or the vacation of a
judgment - should be available to redress the past wrong." Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error
and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 17 (1994) (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr. &
Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1731, 1770 (1991)); accord, e.g., Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 293 (1939) (characterizing a
general harmless error statute applicable to federal courts at the time as a "remedial provision").
8 Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking "Effective Remedies": Remedial Deterrence in International
Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 727 (2008). Available empirical data regarding the prevalence of
harmless error review suggest that Starr might be right about this. See infra note o.
9 See infra section I.B, pp 1805-10.
10 See Charles S. Chapel, The Irony of Harmless Error, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 501, 504 n.26 (1998)
(finding, based on a review of published death penalty decisions by the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals in 1995 and 1996, that in 72% of the cases "at least one claimed error was re-
solved by applying the harmless error rule"); Thomas Y. Davies, Affirmed: A Study of Criminal
Appeals and Decision-Making Norms in a California Court of Appeal, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 543, 604, 617 (finding, based on a review of an intermediate California appellate court's disposi-
tions of appeals by criminal defendants during the fiscal year ending in June 1974, id. at 550, that
"there was at least one harmless error reference in approximately a quarter of all affirmed and
modified appeals," id. at 604, and that "[i]ssues where ... the harmless error rule . . . [was] likely
to apply had very low success rates," id. at 617); Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitu-
tional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 421 & nn.2-3 (1980) (estimating, based
on citator references to the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
22 (1967) (holding that harmless error review applies to some constitutional errors), that, as of
1980, that decision had "determined as many cases as almost any precedent" decided during the
ig60s, Goldberg, supra, at 421 n.2); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split,
88 VA. L. REV. I, 62-72 (2002) (finding, based on a review of death penalty decisions by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court between 1976 and 1996, that during this period "the reversal rate in capital
cases dropped from 94% to 14%," id. at 62, and that the court's "differential use of the harmless
error doctrine" accounted for "nearly all of the difference in death penalty outcomes," id. at 63);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 16I, 182-84 (2001)
(finding, based on a review of federal appellate criminal decisions between 1996 and 1998 that
considered whether an error was harmless, that "[iun 87 percent of the cases, the errors were held
to be harmless," id. at 184); Jason M. Solomon, Causing Constitutional Harm: How Tort Law Can
Help Determine Harmless Error in Criminal Trials, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1053, 1065-67, 1o67 n.64
(2005) (finding, based on a review of published federal appellate habeas decisions that conducted
harmless error review between 1993 and 2004, that courts found errors harmless in "nearly two
out of three analyses," id. at 1067). But cf Harry T Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always
Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, II80-8I, II8O nn.50,
52 (1995) (finding, based on a review of published federal appellate decisions (including civil cas-
es), that only around 2% mentioned "harmless error" between 1969 and 1985 and approximately
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leading contributor to the expansive gap between rights and remedies
in criminal procedure."
Yet, despite the pivotal role the harmless error doctrine plays in
determining the practical efficacy of procedural rules, there are
worrying signs that reviewing courts are currently bungling that cru-
cial function, at least in the criminal procedure context. 1 2  The con-
cerns I find most troubling stem from the dissonance between
the modern harmless error doctrine's reductionism and criminal pro-
cedure's diverse normative ambitions.1 3  Nearly all harmless error
rules used by courts today focus exclusively on whether the procedural
error affected the result of the proceeding under review1 4  (such
as a trial,1 5 plea colloquy,1 6 sentencing hearing,1 7 or grand jury pro-
1.58% did so between 1986 and 1994, compared to the a.79% of cases mentioning "harmless error"
in 1966, before the decision in Chapman).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684, 691-92 (7 th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.).
12 This Article does not address whether the harmless error doctrine presently functions as it
should in civil and administrative cases, or how my proposed method might work outside the con-
text of criminal procedure.
13 See, e.g., Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 79 (1988). Although this normative tension is the primary concern my proposal aims to
address, it bears note that commentators and judges have directed at least three other major ob-
jections at the prevailing approach to harmless error analysis as well. First, many argue that
courts of review are institutionally ill equipped to perform the fact-intensive, and often retrospec-
tive, inquiry that result-based harmless error review entails. See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal
Adjudication, Error Correction, and Hindsight Blind Spots, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165 (2016).
But cf D. Alex Winkelman et al., An Empirical Method for Harmless Error, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1405, 1418-23 (2014) (finding that the reactions of randomly selected laypersons to vignettes loose-
ly derived from the fact patterns of several published harmless error decisions had "some corre-
spondence to the harmless error determinations made by real courts," id. at 1423). This concern is
most acute with respect to errors during the sentencing phase of death penalty trials, where the
factfinder's decision whether to impose a death sentence is highly discretionary and thus unpre-
dictable. See, e.g., Linda E. Carter, Harmless Error in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Case: A
Doctrine Misunderstood and Misapplied, 28 GA. L. REV. 125, 154-57 (1993). Second, others con-
tend that a decision to affirm on harmless error grounds "might be misread" by those who com-
mitted the error as "evidence of the court's willingness to tolerate" error or even as "winking at
lawlessness." Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50
TEX. L. REV. 629, 662 (1972); accord, e.g., United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631,
66 1-63 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., dissenting). And third, some worry that the lack of a meaningful
relationship between the analysis involved in determining whether error occurred and that re-
quired to decide whether error affected the outcome enables courts of review in many cases to
skip any consideration of the alleged error and to affirm solely on fact-bound harmless error
grounds, impeding the law-declaration function of reviewing courts. See, e.g., Kamin, supra note
1o, at 7. But cf. Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the
Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 48-49 (1990) ("Particularly where the
evidence of guilt at trial was very strong, . . . the appellate court may be reluctant to reverse. If
such judicial bias against criminal appellants exists, the harmless error doctrine is a near-perfect
means of ensuring that such bias does not affect the development of legal standards.").
14 See infra section IA, pp. 1799-805.1 See, e.g., Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24.
16 See, e.g., United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2150 (2013).
17 See, e.g., Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1349 (2016).
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ceeding"). I group these rules together under the label result-based
harmless error review. Result-based harmless error review's preoccu-
pation with the outputs of criminal processes stands in marked con-
trast with criminal procedure's broader ethical vision, which encom-
passes a diverse array of "non-truth-furthering" interests" - interests
that include providing defendants with space for autonomous
decisionmaking, enforcing compliance with nondiscrimination norms,
and making transparent the inner workings of criminal justice 2 0  in
addition to "truth-furthering" objectives. 2 1
The goal of this Article is to formulate an alternative approach to
harmless error analysis that better reflects the full range of interests
enshrined in the law of criminal procedure. That approach, which I
call contextual harmless error review, involves two steps.
A court using the method I propose would begin by identifying the
interest (or range of interests) protected by whichever procedural rule
was infringed. The interests that underpin various rules in criminal
procedure are not all cut from the same cloth, as noted above, and the
interests that are relevant to harmless error review in each case would
reflect this variability This is the first sense in which the style of
harmless error analysis I envision is contextual.
After discerning the pertinent universe of legally protected inter-
ests, a court would conduct contextual harmless error review, in accord
with the principle that remedies should generally correspond to "the
nature of the interests that comprise the rights" they are meant to en-
force. 2 2 The court would balance the redressable harm caused by the
error against the social cost of reversal and reverse if the former out-
weighs the latter. The harm engendered by error of course varies from
one case to the next, as does the cost of reversal, which depends sub-
stantially on the type of reversal (in the broad and nontechnical sense
in which I am using that term) sought by the defendant.
Shifting from the current result-based harmless error regime to the
one I propose would have far-reaching benefits. Perhaps the most im-
portant effects of the reform I advocate relate to the large group of
cases in which reviewing courts find that the prosecution presented
overwhelming evidence against the defendant apart from and untaint-
ed by the error. Result-based harmless error rules almost universally
forbid reversal in these situations, no matter how egregious the error,
on the theory that the factfinder most likely would have rendered the
18 See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256 (1988).
19 Stacy & Dayton, supra note 13, at 94.
20 See infra section IIA, pp. 1810-14.
21 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at IOg2; see also id. at 1092-94.
22 JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 3.1, at II (3d ed. 2014) ("The nature
of an available remedy is clearly tied to the substantive right at issue.").
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same decision based on the untainted evidence had the error not oc-
curred. 2 3  By disassociating the defendant's entitlement to reversal
from the gravity of the error in cases where the untainted evidence is
overwhelming, result-based harmless error review gives prosecutors
and trial judges unbridled license in those cases to commit error of the
very worst kinds without risking reversal.
My proposal would alleviate this problem by leaving reversal on
the table regardless of how strong the prosecution's untainted evidence
might be. This is not to say that the strength of the prosecution's case
would be irrelevant. Insofar as the errors under review implicate only
truth-furthering interests - or non-truth-furthering interests that are
result-correlated in the sense described below 2 4 - contextual harmless
error analysis would yield outcomes similar or even identical to those
produced by the current result-based rules. And even for errors that
impinge on non-truth-furthering interests that are result-independent
(again, as defined below 2 5 ), the reliability of the untainted evidence re-
tains some relevance to contextual harmless error review because it is
generally more costly to reverse an outcome backed by compelling evi-
dence than an outcome that has weaker evidentiary support. But a
contextual approach to harmless error review would not automatically
treat the existence of overwhelming untainted evidence as dispositive
with respect to rules that protect result-independent interests. No
matter how compelling the evidence against the defendant, a court ap-
plying contextual harmless error review would still need to consider
whether the error harmed result-independent interests to a degree war-
ranting reversal.
Despite all this, I acknowledge that there are plausible arguments
in favor of retaining the result-based harmless error regime. One
might defend it, for example, on the grounds that (i) injuries to result-
independent interests, though regrettable, are rarely if ever important
enough to justify reversal, 2 6 (2) result-based harmless error review
achieves a satisfactory level of systemic compliance with the law by
disincentivizing errors caused by a desire to tilt the result in the prose-
23 As explained below, there are rare situations in which a court applying result-based harm-
less error rules must reverse, despite the court's opinion that the prosecution's untainted evidence
is overwhelming, infra note 69. This situation occurs when the record indicates that the
factfinder did not find the evidence to be overwhelming. A jury might, for example, evince doubt
regarding aspects of the prosecution's case by sending notes during deliberations, delivering a
split verdict that convicts the defendant on some counts while acquitting or failing to achieve
unanimity on others, or by deliberating for a period long enough to suggest that the jury did not
view the case as a slam dunk for the prosecution.
24 See infra p. 1814.
25 See infra p. 1814.
26 See, e.g., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986). But see, e.g., Stacy & Dayton,
supra note 13, at 85.
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cution's favor,2 7 and (3) civil, disciplinary, and other remedies are su-
perior, compared with reversal, as mechanisms for addressing errors
that cause harm to interests unrelated to the outcome. 2 8
Although these arguments are not without problems, they would
hold together well enough if there were no other viable way of ap-
proaching harmless error analysis - if, in other words, automatic re-
versal were the only alternative to result-based harmless error review.
And that is certainly the impression one gets from much of the existing
literature about harmless error review. 2 9  In their zeal to expand the
list of procedural errors that are completely exempt from harmless er-
ror review of any kind,3 0 commentators have for the most part over-
looked the possibility of developing alternative methods of harmless
error review that are not result-based.3 1  As we shall see, courts grade
slightly better on this measure: in one understudied area of criminal
procedure that deals with certain types of recusal errors, courts have
formulated a non-result-based "special harmless error test" that I re-
27 See, e.g., William R. Newlin, Recent Decision, Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963), 25
U. PITT. L. REV. 6ol, 603-04 (1964). But cf sources cited supra note 13.
28 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note ro, at 186. But there is broad agreement that these
remedies, however desirable they might be in the abstract, are currently all but nonexistent and
thus that "for criminal defendants whose rights are violated at trial, it is 'reversal or nothing.'
Meltzer, supra note 7, at 31 (modifying Justice Harlan's statement in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (197), that "[flor [innocent] people
in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing," id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)).
And although I agree that criminal defendants also need more expansive access to remedies other
than reversal, proposals of that kind and efforts like mine to improve the rules that determine
when criminal procedure remedies (in particular, reversal) are warranted are not mutually exclu-
sive. See Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, Enforcing Rights, 62 UCLA L. REV. 306, 346 (2015) (dis-
cussing the advantages of "multiple remedial avenues" for procedural error).
29 See, e.g., 3 B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 854 (4 th ed.) (Westlaw) (last visited Mar. 8, 2017) ("What Justice Rutledge wrote in [Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)]" - the most influential case describing the methodology of
result-based harmless error review, see infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text - "may well be
all that can usefully be said of the [harmless error] rule.").
3o See, e.g., David R. Dow & James Rytting, Can Constitutional Error Be Harmless?, 2000
UTAH L. REV. 483; Goldberg, supra note ro; Stacy & Dayton, supra note 13; Robert Pondolfi,
Comment, Principles for Application of the Harmless Error Standard, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 616,
629 (1974); The Supreme Court, i66 Term - Leading Cases, 81 HARV. L. REV. IIO, 205-09
(1967). But see, e.g., Steven M. Shepard, Note, The Case Against Automatic Reversal of Structur-
al Errors, 117 YALE L.J. 1180 (2008).
3 There are a few exceptions to my claim that prior scholarship has neglected to explore non-
result-based methods of harmless error review. The proposal most compatible with mine is that
of Judge Chapel, which would ask "whether any error had a significant effect upon a right of the
accused" and would answer that question based in part on the "purpose" of the infringed rule.
Chapel, supra note io, at 534; see also David McCord, The "Trial"/"Structural" Error Dichotomy:
Erroneous, and Not Harmless, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1454-57 (1997) (calling for a "case-by-
case inquiry into whether a particular error requires reversal," id. at 1454, which revolves around
eight factors that include "[t]he degree of infringement" associated with the error, id. at 1455).
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gard as a prototype for the method I propose in this Article. 3 2  But
courts have not adapted that test for use outside the narrow doctrinal
context in which it emerged. And the academic literature relating to
harmless error review has inexplicably failed even to notice its
existence.3 3
This Article raises as many questions as it answers. My purpose is
not to identify and weigh all of the potential costs and benefits of tran-
sitioning from the current remedial order to one organized around con-
textual harmless error analysis. Rather, I intend to show that contex-
tual harmless error review is a normatively plausible alternative to the
current result-based rules, and to lay the groundwork for future schol-
arship that can systematically assess its viability
I. THE NARROW PATHS TO REVERSAL
FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ERRORS
In this Part, I advance three primary claims.
First, harmless error review as currently applied in criminal cases
almost invariably focuses on whether the error might have affected the
outcome of the proceeding under review. 34 My label for this mode of
inquiry is result-based harmless error review.
Second, harmless error review has largely crowded out alternative
pathways to reversal such as automatic reversal and reversals based on
a court's supervisory power, albeit without completely eliminating
them.35
And finally, the main ideas that commentators have put forward in
their longstanding efforts to improve the law of harmless error have
not borne much fruit. Those who argue that harmless error analysis
should pay little or no heed to the prosecution's untainted evidence
and should instead simply ask whether the error affected the outcome
propose an impossible task, as courts cannot avoid examining the er-
ror's context to discern its probable effect, and that context necessarily
includes the untainted evidence.3 6 Others urge courts to exempt large
swaths of criminal procedure from existing harmless error rules, but
without offering any viable replacement to sweeten the deal.3 7 Courts
32 E.g., Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745, 746-47 (D.C. 1989) (en banc) (adopting Liljeberg
v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988)); see infra section IC, pp. 1820-23.
33 To be sure, commentators have helpfully analyzed the Liljeberg harmless error method as it
relates to recusal law. See, e.g., Leslie W Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When
a Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 73-75
(2000). My point is simply that the potential significance of Liljeberg and its progeny to the
broader debate about harmless error review has thus far gone unexamined.
34 See infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
35 See infra section I.B, pp. 1805-10.
36 See infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
37 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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have balked at this proposal.38  If we are to address the serious con-
cern that "nearly ubiquitous use of a harmless error rule focusing on
the outcome of the trial . . . denigrates important constitutional protec-
tions . . . that promote values other than the reliability of [guilty] ver-
dicts," 3 9 we will need to look for solutions elsewhere.
A. Result-Based Harmless Error Review
This section explores how the prevailing result-based method of
harmless error review works, the principles it embodies, and from
whence it came. I argue that much of the existing case law and com-
mentary misunderstands important facets of the modern harmless er-
ror doctrine's conceptual structure. These misunderstandings have
impeded efforts to diagnose the ailment that has afflicted our courts of
review and to determine how best to cure it. Clearing up these mat-
ters at the outset will facilitate the normative analysis that follows lat-
er in the Article.
Federal courts typically apply one of three rules when conducting
harmless error review in criminal cases. These rules fairly represent
the broader universe of harmless error rules currently used by
American courts, subject to a few exceptions. 40 For most constitution-
al claims preserved by a timely defense objection (and reviewed on di-
rect appeal), Chapman v. California4 1 holds that courts may declare the
error harmless only if the prosecution "prove[s] beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error . . . did not contribute to the verdict." 4 2 Federal
courts reviewing preserved nonconstitutional claims, by contrast, ordi-
narily apply the standard set forth in Kotteakos v. United States,43
which asks whether the court can say with "fair assurance" that the
outcome "was not substantially swayed by the error." 4 4 (Federal courts
38 See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
39 Stacy & Dayton, supra note 13, at 80-81. I develop a similar argument in Part II. See infra
Part II, pp. 1810-23.
40 I discuss the most important of these exceptions - the harmless error rule applicable to cer-
tain types of recusal errors set forth in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
847, 862-65 (1988) - in section IIC, infra pp. 1820-23.
41 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
42 Id. at 24. Chapman left open the possibility that there might be "some constitutional rights
so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error," id. at 23, citing
as examples the rule against admission of "coerced confession[s]," the "right to counsel," and the
requirement of an "impartial judge," id. at 23 n.8. To mention just a few of the many excellent
works analyzing Chapman and its progeny, see, for example, ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE
OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970); John M. Greabe, The Riddle of Harmless Error Revisited, 54
Hous. L. REV. 59 (2016); Philip J. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of
Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519 (1969); Meltzer, supra note 7; and Stephen A.
Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973).
43 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
44 Id. at 765.
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also apply Kotteakos with respect to constitutional errors when
considering those errors on collateral review, as in Brecht v.
Abrahamson,4 5 rather than on direct appeal.4 6 ) And the federal harm-
less error standard for unpreserved claims, set forth in United States v.
Olano47 and related cases, calls for the "same kind of inquiry" but
"with one important difference": "the defendant rather than the Gov-
ernment ... bears the burden of persuasion with respect to preju-
dice" 48 and must show a "reasonable probability" that "the result of the
proceeding would have been different" without the error.4 9
The feature that unites these rules is that each permits reversal on-
ly when the error might have affected the outcome. In other respects,
of course, they differ. For one thing, Chapman and Kotteakos assign to
the prosecution the burden of showing that the error is harmless,5 0
whereas Olano allocates the burden of demonstrating harm to the de-
fense.5 1  And each of these rules requires a different level of certainty
that the error affected the result. But however important these varia-
tions might be, they relate only to (i) which party bears the burden of
proof and (2) how certain the reviewing court must be with respect to
the error's effect or lack of effect. All three rules are fundamentally
similar insofar as they define harm solely in terms of the likelihood
that the error affected the outcome.
Precisely what it means for an error to affect the outcome has
proven controversial, due primarily to the large subset of harmless er-
ror cases in which courts have affirmed on the ground that the un-
45 507 U.S. 6ig (1993).
46 Id. at 637-38. The Court has since reaffirmed Brecht in Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. II2 (2007).
In that case, the Court rejected the defendant's claim that Congress implicitly superseded Brecht
by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(I) (2012), which requires federal courts to restrict their collateral
review of state court proceedings to rulings that are "contrary to, or involve[] . . . unreasonable
application[s] of, clearly established Federal law." Fry, 551 U.S. at iig (quoting § 225 4 (d)(I)); id.
at II9-20.
47 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
48 Id. at 734.
49 United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004) (quoting United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)) (endorsing Bagley as "a sensible model" for
application of Olano that bears "similarities to the Kotteakos formulation," id. at 81). To prevail
with an unpreserved claim, the defendant must establish not only that error occurred and that the
error was harmful under the Olano-Bagley test, but also that the error is "clear or obvious" and
"'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."' Puckett
v. United States, 556 U.S. I29, I35 (2009) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 736 (alteration in
original)).
5o See, e.g., O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 438-39 (1995) (noting that Chapman and
Kotteakos "[b]oth ... plac[ed] the risk of doubt on the State," id. at 439, and disregarding lan-
guage in Brecht that may have suggested otherwise about Kotteakos, id. at 438 (citing Brecht, 507
U.S. at 637)).51 See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.
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tainted evidence against the defendant is "overwhelming." 5 2  Many
commentators have argued that these cases represent a "guilt-based"
harmless error test that is sharply at odds with the "effect-on-the-
verdict approach" reflected in other decisions. 5 3  Most of those who
take this position concede that even when applying the effect-on-the-
verdict test, courts may properly consider the strength of the govern-
ment's untainted evidence as a factor in determining the error's ef-
fect. 5 4 But they perceive a meaningful distinction, in theory if perhaps
not in practical application, between asking (I) whether "the untainted
evidence . . . alone compels a verdict of guilty"5 5 without the error and
(2) whether "the error might have swayed the factfinder." 5 6  And they
52 E.g., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969). Although truly overwhelming evi-
dence "alone may be dispositive" in some cases, State v. Romero, 381 P 3 d 297, 302 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2016), the relative strength or weakness of the evidence remains relevant even when the evidence
is not overwhelming, see, e.g., Brecht, 507 U.S. at 639 ("[T]he State's evidence of guilt was, if not
overwhelming, certainly weighty."). See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 854 ("Per-
haps the single most significant factor in weighing whether an error was harmful, although not
the only one, is the strength of the case against the defendant.").
3 Edwards, supra note ro, at i171. A nonexhaustive list of commentators who have thought-
fully endeavored to classify harmless error decisions in this fashion - and to criticize cases fitting
the guilt-based description - includes Alschuler, supra note 13, at 661-62, 666; Jeffrey 0. Cooper,
Searching for Harmlessness: Method and Madness in the Supreme Court's Harmless Constitution-
al Error Doctrine, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 309 passim (2002); Martha A. Field, Assessing the Harm-
lessness of Federal Constitutional Error - A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
15, 16-19 (1976); John M.M. Greabe, Spelling Guilt Out of a Record? Harmless-Error Review of
Conclusive Mandatory Presumptions and Elemental Misdescriptions, 74 B.U. L. REV. 819 passim
(1994); Griffin, supra note 13, at 197-203; Anne Bowen Poulin, Tests for Harm in Criminal Cases:
A Fix for Blurred Lines, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 991, 1024 (2015); Dan Simon, A Third View of the
Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 578-83 (2004);
Solomon, supra note io, passim; Lee E. Teitelbaum et al., Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect Of
Evidence: Can Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. REV.
1147, 1176-92; and Gregory Mitchell, Comment, Against "Overwhelming" Appellate Activism:
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1335 passim (1994). Some courts have
accepted this analysis, but they are few and far between. See infra notes 71-72 and accompany-
ing text.
54 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 202
(2006). Some, however, contend without qualification that harmless error analysis "should not ...
consider the strength of the remaining evidence." Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows,
49 GA. L. REV. 309, 366 (2015); see also id. at 371-72.
5 Field, supra note 53, at 17.
56 Id. at l6; see also id. at 16-18. The best attempt to pinpoint the difference between these
formulations, I think, is Professor Jason Solomon's explanation that the guilt-based test "plays out
an alternative (counterfactual) history." Solomon, supra note ro, at 1o76 (quoting Robert N.
Strassfeld, If... : Counterfactuals in the Law, 6o GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339, 346 (1992)). In
Solomon's view, the guilt-based approach asks the counterfactual question "whether, if not for the
error, the defendant would have been convicted" whereas the "error-based approach asks not a
counterfactual question but a historical one - essentially, was the error a 'substantial factor' in
the jury's verdict?" Id. But Solomon acknowledges that the "substantial factor test" after which
he models his proposed harmless error rule has been "roundly criticized as indeterminate and un-
helpful" in the tort domain from which it comes. Id. at 1075. And he ultimately concedes that
"some assessment of the strength of the prosecution's case is appropriate and usually necessary"
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contend that courts should reject the guilt-based approach because,
among other reasons, it allows "[s]trong evidence of guilt [to] trump
even grave error," which "undercuts the expressive, educational, and
deterrent functions of appellate review."5
There was a time when this distinction between a guilt-based
harmless error method and an effect-on-the-verdict alternative would
have aptly described a significant split within the case law. Many cas-
es during the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth
embodied the guilt-based approach in holding that the party who lost
at trial was "not harmed" by procedural error where "[tihe result is
right, although the manner of reaching it may have been wrong."5 8
This approach, now known as the "[c]orrect [r]esult test," 5 9 naturally
invited courts to weigh the strength of the untainted evidence and po-
tentially even the tainted evidence when deciding whether an error re-
quires reversal. Another substantial group of harmless error opinions
from this period rejected that approach, 6 0 however, and held - in lan-
guage reflecting an effect-on-the-verdict orientation - that error is
harmless only if the reviewing court "can say affirmatively the accused
could not have been harmed from that cause." 6 1 This group of cases,
much like the first, took into account the strength of the prosecution's
untainted evidence, even to the point of making that consideration
and that reviewing courts cannot solely "look[] at the error itself, but . . . should also assess the
probability of conviction before the error." Id. at 1084.
5 Simon, supra note 53, at 582. Other common objections include the inability of reviewing
courts operating under hindsight bias to reliably assess the strength of the prosecution's case, see,
e.g., Griffin, supra note 13, at 197-99, and the "usurpation by the appellate court of the ultimate
fact-finding responsibility, in contravention of the defendant's right to a jury trial," Linda E.
Carter, The Sporting Approach to Harmless Error in Criminal Cases: The Supreme Court's "No
Harm, No Foul" Debacle in Neder v. United States, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 229, 230 (2001).
58 Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 294, 301 (1874).
5 TRAYNOR, supra note 42, at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60 See, e.g., Lipscomb v. State, 23 SO. 210, 221 (Miss. 1898).
61 Austin v. People, 102 111. 261, 264 (1882), quoted approvingly in Wilson v. United States, 149
U.S. 6o, 69-70 (1893). See generally I JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §2 1 (2d ed. 1923)
(providing an extensive - but also polemical, and not entirely reliable - summary of harmless
error decisions from this period). One can find still other analytical methods elsewhere in this
nascent body of harmless error jurisprudence, methods that have long since fallen out of the dia-
logue concerning harmless error review and perhaps warrant renewed exploration. See, e.g.,
Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Standard Asphalt & Rubber Co., 275 U.S. 372, 383-84 (1928) (hold-
ing that the appellant's submission of an unabridged appellate record, which violated a rule stat-
ing that the record must present the evidence in "simple and condensed form," id. at 383, was not
harmless, emphasizing that the "purpose of the statute" was to alleviate burdens on the courts and
warning that "[r]epetition of [the error] in other cases would soon congest the dockets of the appel-
late courts," id. at 384).
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dispositive in certain circumstances. 6 2 Yet they did so with a different
purpose in mind: "not [to] say that the defendant is guilty," but to es-
timate the likelihood that "the same result would have been reached"
by an "average juror" and thus, inferentially, by the jury that actually
rendered the verdict.6 3
There is no comparable split, however, within the modern harmless
error doctrine. During the early years of the twentieth century,
Congress rebuffed an organized effort by the bar to codify a harmless
error rule verging on the correct-result test,6 4 choosing instead to enact
a compromise measure that required federal courts to give judgment
"without regard to technical errors . . . which do not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties"6 5 - a formulation courts had already
embraced for many years. 6 6 With time, courts fleshed out the details
of this equivocal mandate by rejecting the correct-result test, due pri-
marily to the concern that it usurped the jury's prerogative to "deter-
mine guilt or innocence,"67  and by embracing various effect-on-the-
verdict formulations deemed more consistent with the premise that
guilt must be "found by a jury according to the procedure and stand-
ards appropriate for criminal trials."68  Under these tests, too, courts
examine the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence, but
62 See, e.g., State v. Cluff, 158 P 701, 705 (Utah 1916) (affirming on harmless error grounds
where the prosecution proved its allegations with "good and undisputed evidence and by the de-
fendant's own and undenied admissions").
63 Id.
64 See 5 A.B.A. J. 455, 455-56 (rgg). The bill first proposed by the American Bar Association
(ABA) in 19o8 would have divested federal courts of the power to reverse unless there had been a
"miscarriage of justice," id. at 455, a term that most reformers believed encaspulated the correct-
result approach, see, e.g., Charles F. Amidon, The Quest for Error and the Doing of Justice, 40
AM. L. REV. 68I, 6go-gi (1906); Report of the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and For-
mulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, 31 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 542, 542 (1907). See generally Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., A Fair Trial, Not a Perfect One: The
Early Twentieth-Century Campaign for the Harmless Error Rule, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 433, 437-50
(2009) (describing the roles played by several leaders of this reform movement). Although a mi-
nority of state legislatures endorsed the miscarriage-of-justice formulation, their courts generally
construed such statutes in a grudging manner that brought them into conformity with the courts'
own views concerning proper harmless error analysis. See John H. Wigmore, Reversible Error, ig
J. AM. JUDICATURE SOc'Y 28, 29 (1935) (noting that the "indefinite phrase 'miscarriage of jus-
tice' has usually availed little to change the actual practice of appellate tribunals" because "[tihe
habits of thought . .. have been too powerful to be overcome by a mere legislative form of
words").
65 Act of Feb. 26, 1919, Pub. L. No. 65-281, 40 Stat. 1181, 1181.
66 See, e.g., Williams v. Great S. Lumber Co., 277 U.S. 19, 26 (1928) ("Since the passage of [the
Act of Feb. 26, Iglg], as well as before, an error which relates, not to merely formal or technical
matters, but to the substantial rights of the parties 'is to be held a ground for reversal, unless it
appears from the whole record that it was harmless and did not prejudice the rights of the com-
plaining party."' (quoting United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 421
(1926))).
67 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763 (1946).
68 Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946).
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with an eye to determining whether it was the error or an innocent
cause - the untainted evidence - that precipitated the outcome. 9
The tests set forth in Kotteakos, Chapman, and Olano each fit com-
fortably within that tradition. 0
I, like many others, am troubled by the outsized role that consider-
ation of the strength of the prosecution's case plays in harmless error
review today. Nor do I think many courts fully anticipated how
large - and logically unavoidable, once one accepts the basic parame-
ters of result-based harmless error review - that role would become,
as evidenced by passages in both Chapman and Kotteakos that try to
downplay the centrality of untained prosecution evidence to result-
based harmless error analysis." But it did not take the Supreme
Court long to figure out, a mere two years after Chapman, that in some
cases the evidence truly is "so overwhelming" that its "probable im-
pact" on a rational or "average" jury is so certain that a reviewing
court can find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the verdict resulted
from that evidence rather than from the error.7 2  The question posed
69 See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999) ("In this situation, where a reviewing
court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and sup-
ported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent
the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless. We think it beyond cavil
here that the error 'did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' (quoting Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967))). See generally Daniel J. Kornstein, A Bayesian Model of Harmless Error,
5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (1976) (arguing that modern harmless error jurisprudence is conceptually
consistent in that it defines the effect-on-the-verdict test in terms of a "but-for" concept of causa-
tion under which "the probability of guilt given the [untainted] evidence[] . . . is absolutely neces-
sary to arrive at an intelligent conclusion regarding the error's effect on the verdict," id. at 143).
Revealingly, modern result-based harmless error rules do not permit courts to affirm on the
ground that the prosecution's untainted evidence is overwhelming when the record contains relia-
ble indications that the factfinder itself did not regard that evidence as ironclad. See, e.g.,
Bollenbach, 326 U.S. at 614 (rejecting the prosecution's argument that its strong proof of guilt
rendered the instructional error harmless given the "vital fact that for seven hours the jury was
unable to find guilt in the light of the main charge, but reached a verdict of guilty under the con-
spiracy count five minutes after their inquiry was answered by an untenable legal proposition").
70 See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
71 See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 767.
72 Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969); accord, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411
U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372-73, 377-78 (1972); Schneble v.
Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430-32 (1972). See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Error and the
Valid Rule Requirement, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 206-O7 ("[C]ourts, particularly appellate courts,
presume a rational jury that will act in accordance with the instructions given it. . . . [I]t is diffi-
cult to see how any other premise could be employed in a systematic way as a basis for judicial
reasoning."). The Court's decision in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), briefly gave new
life to the proposition that "[t]he inquiry . . . is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the
error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error." Id. at 279. But to the extent that
Sullivan, a unanimous opinion, "seemed to represent a clear triumph for the effect-on-the-jury
standard of harmless error," Neder soon made clear that "the triumph was illusory." Cooper, su-
pra note 53, at 323; see also supra note 69 (quoting relevant language from Neder). To be sure, a
small group of state courts still find it worthwhile to talk of a distinction between an "overwhelm-
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by the guilt-based approach to harmless error review - whether the
prosecution's untainted evidence is so overwhelming that any reasona-
ble jury would have reached the same verdict as the actual jury - is
thus an indispensible ingredient of the effect-on-the-verdict approach
and not something alien to it.
B. Exceptions to the Harmless Error Rule
In certain exceptional situations a defendant whose claim would
not pass muster under the relevant harmless error standard might nev-
ertheless obtain reversal by pursuing either of two alternative avenues.
One involves the "supervisory authority" 3  of appellate courts to
"maintain[] civilized standards of procedure,"7 4 which encompasses the
power to reverse without regard to "actual prejudice"7 5 as a means of
"deterring illegality and protecting judicial integrity."7 6  The superviso-
ry power has become "largely irrelevant"" in the criminal appeal con-
text, however, in light of decisions making it available "only in the
ing evidence test," which inappropriately "substitute[s] [the appellate court] for the trier-of-fact
by . . . weighing the evidence," and a test that focuses on "the effect of the error on the trier-of-
fact," which calls for a more limited inquiry regarding "whether there is a reasonable possibility
that the error affected the verdict." State v. DiGuilio, 491 SO. 2d II29, 1139 (Fla. 1986). But even
those cases recognize - as do most commentators who recognize this distinction - that review-
ing courts may consider the strength of the prosecution's evidence as "one factor" among others in
determining the effect of the error. Ventura v. State, 29 So. 3d ro86, rogr (Fla. 2010).
73 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
74 Id. at 340; accord, e.g., State v. Rose, 46 A. 3 d 146, 153 (Conn. 2012). Professor Amy Coney
Barrett aptly characterizes the Supreme Court's supervisory-power decisions as a kind of "proce-
dural common law" consisting of rules "not otherwise required by Congress or the Constitution."
Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, ro6 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 332
(2006). But cf. Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitu-
tional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433,
1520 (1984) (arguing that courts use the term supervisory power to describe "several different
forms of judicial power" and that some of these forms are legitimate while others are not).
75 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 811 (1987) (plurality opin-
ion); id. at 809-14, 809 n.2I (holding, through exercise of the supervisory power, that it is reversi-
ble error for a federal court to appoint a private litigant's attorney to prosecute a criminal con-
tempt charge against that litigant's adversary); id. at 815 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(supplying the fifth vote, though on other grounds, for the proposition that the error identified by
the plurality requires automatic reversal).
76 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.8 (1980).
7 Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 432 (1992); see also
id. at 432 & n.244 (arguing that United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983), and Bank of Nova
Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988), rendered the supervisory power "subservient to the
harmless error rule" and thus "largely irrelevant," Gershman, supra, at 432, in determining when
reversal is available to redress procedural error in federal cases). But cf Paul J. Spiegelman,
Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of Intent in Appellate Review, i J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 118, 163 (1999) (finding, based on forty-five federal cases addressing
claims that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper, that "even when courts acknowledge
the limitations of Hasting, they continue to write opinions that suggest that the intention of the
prosecutor affects their decision to reverse," id. at 163).
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most extreme circumstances" and requiring courts to undertake a
"careful . . . balancing[] of all the relevant interests"' (including "the
interests preserved by the doctrine of harmless error" 9 ) before citing it
as the basis for reversal. So the balance of this section will examine
the somewhat larger group of cases in which courts have held, without
exercising their supervisory power, that certain types of error require
automatic reversal if preserved through a timely objection. 0
Most cases that have confronted this issue in recent years have ap-
plied the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Arizona v.
Fulminante.1 In considering whether errors involving the admission
of a defendant's coerced confession warrant automatic reversal, the
Court first observed that it had "applied harmless error analysis to a
wide range of errors," 8 2 which it characterized as "trial error[s]."8 3  It
contrasted these so-called trial errors with "structural defects, 84
"which are not subject to harmless error"8 5 and which include (I) "total
deprivation of the right to counsel at trial,"8 6 (2) handling of the trial
78 Hasting, 461 U.S. at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79 Id. at 507 (majority opinion) (underscoring that "reversals of convictions under the court's
supervisory power must be approached 'with some caution,' and with a view toward balancing
the interests involved," id. at 506-07 (citation omitted) (quoting Payner, 447 U.S. at 734), and that
"the interests preserved by the doctrine of harmless error cannot be so lightly and casually ignored
in order to chastise . . . prosecutorial overreaching," id. at 507); accord, e.g., State v. Pouncey, 699
A.2d goi, 907 (Conn. 1997).
8 See generally 7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.6(d), at 143-68
(4 th ed. 2015) (summarizing the Supreme Court's automatic-reversal jurisprudence). The Court
has yet to decide whether the exemptions from harmless error review it has developed with re-
spect to preserved claims also apply to unpreserved claims. See, e.g., United States v. Marcus, 56o
U.S. 258, 263 (2010) (reserving this question).
499 U.S. 279 (Iggl); see, e.g., Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 431-32 (2014) (per curiam) (ap-
plying Fulminante). It remains unsettled whether Fulminante, which involved a constitutional
error, 499 U.S. at 282, also furnishes the proper standard for deciding which nonconstitutional
errors are amenable to harmless error analysis. Compare, e.g., Green v. United States, 262 F.3 d
715, 717-18 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying Fulminante in holding that automatic reversal is appropriate
for violations of the nonconstitutional rule obligating district courts to appoint counsel under cer-
tain conditions for a petitioner challenging his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012)), with id. at
7ig (Bye, J., dissenting) ("Structural errors [as defined in Fulminante] appear to be confined to the
constitutional sphere . . . ."), and Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 152-53 (2001) (holding,
without applying Fulminante, that violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers's "anti-
shuttling" provisions require automatic reversal).
82 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306.
83 Id. at 307.
84 Id. at 309.
85 Id. at 310.
86 Id. at 309 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). The Supreme Court has
greatly diminished the practical import of this structural-error category by fashioning a "general
rule" that, to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the defendant "must
demonstrate 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different."' Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002) (quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). Mickens crystallized the low bar set by
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by "a judge who was not impartial,"8 7 (3) racial discrimination during
selection of the grand jury,8 (4) violation of the defendant's right to
represent herself at trial, 9 and (5) deprivation of the right to a public
trial.90 And the Court held that erroneous introduction of the defend-
ant's coerced confession is a trial error, at least to the extent that the
police did not resort to "physical violence" in extracting the
confession. 1
The conceptual foundation of Fulminante is tenuous at best. The
terms trial error and structural defect as used there refer, respectively,
to errors or defects relating to the procedure or structure of a criminal
trial. But error is virtually synonymous with defect in this context, 9 2
and dictionary entries for procedure and structure suggest that trial
procedure and trial structure likewise have similar meanings.9 3  Con-
fusing matters further, the Supreme Court has endorsed several "dif-
ferent and largely inconsistent" interpretations of the trial/structural-
error dichotomy,9 4 each ambiguous in its own right and unable to ex-
Strickland, whereby the presence of counsel, even if in name only, effectively insulates a convic-
tion from reversal on Sixth Amendment grounds.
87 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)). When a judge's
erroneous failure to recuse herself runs afoul of judicial ethics rules but does not violate due pro-
cess, however, many courts apply an unusual species of harmless error analysis derived from
Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988), rather than automatic rever-
sal. See infra section IIC, pp. 1820-23.
88 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)).
89 Id. (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984)). Although McKaskle held
that violation of the defendant's constitutional right to represent herself at trial requires automatic
reversal, see 465 U.S. at 177 n.8, it also made clear that improper restrictions on the defendant's
pro se efforts do not violate the Constitution unless they deprive the defendant of "a fair chance to
present his case in his own way," id. at 177.
90 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 & n.9 (1984)).
91 Id. at 311.
92 The harmless error statute that governs appeals in federal courts, for example, applies to
"errors" and "defects" alike and extends the same rule to both: "[T]he court shall give judg-
ment . . . without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the par-
ties." 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2012); see also Error, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) ("An
assertion or belief that does not conform to objective reality"); Defect, BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY, supra ("An imperfection or shortcoming.").
93 Compare, e.g., Procedure, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 92 ("A specific method
or course of action." (emphasis added)), and Procedural Law, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 92 ("The rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced." (em-
phasis added)), with Structure, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 92 ((I) "Any construc-
tion, production, or piece of work artificially . .. composed of parts purposefully joined together,"
(2) "The organization of elements or parts," or (3) "A method of constructing parts." (emphases
added)).
94 McCord, supra note 31, at 1412. Fulminante defines structural defects both by means of
contrasting them with trial errors, see supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text, and by suggest-
ing that they (i) inhere "in the constitution of the trial mechanism," Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309,
(2) "defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards," id., (3) influence "[tihe entire conduct of the trial
from beginning to end," id., (4) "affect[] the framework within which the trial proceeds," id. at
310, (5) subvert "basic protections" without which the "trial cannot reliably serve its function as a
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plain which errors the Court has subjected to harmless error review
and which it has not.
Consider, for instance, the Court's widely cited pronouncement that
trial error means "error which occurred during the presentation of the
case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in
the context of other evidence . . . to determine whether [it] was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt."9 5  Read in context, this passage sug-
gests that the first characteristic mentioned by the Court ("occurred
during the presentation of the case to the jury"9 6 ) logically entails the
second ("may therefore be quantitatively assessed"97 ) and that trial er-
rors necessarily possess both9 ' whereas structural errors do not.9 9
These assumptions are unsupportable. Four of the five errors the
Court characterized as structural in Fulminante can, and often do,
"occur[] during the presentation of the case to the jury,"100 bringing
them within the first part of the above definition for trial error. And
at least four of those errors, possibly even all five, can "be quantita-
tively[101 ] assessed in the context of other evidence" in a considerable
vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence" and punishment cannot "be regarded as funda-
mentally fair," id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)), and (6) "transcend[] the
criminal process," id. at 311. Building on the fifth of these descriptions, several of the Court's
post-Fulminante decisions indicate that for an error to be structural it must "always" or "neces-
sarily" render the trial in which it occurs "fundamentally unfair." Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. i, 9 (1999); see also, e.g., United States v. Marcus, 56o U.S. 258, 265 (2010) (refusing to re-
quire automatic reversal where "[tihere is . . . no reason to believe that all or almost all such errors
always 'affec[t] the framework within which the trial proceeds"' (second alteration in original)
(quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310), "or 'necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally un-
fair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence"' (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at g)).
Yet in one case, the Court expressly rejected as "inflexible" the notion that "only those errors that
always or necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair and unreliable are structural," noting
that some of its precedents had found structural error based on other criteria like "the difficulty of
assessing the effect of the error" or "the irrelevance of harmlessness." United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006).
9 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08.
96 Id. at 307.
97 Id. at 307-08.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 310 (asserting that a structural defect differs from a trial error in that it "affect[s]
the framework within which the trial proceeds" and is not "simply an error in the trial process
itself").
100 Id. at 307. The sole exception is the listed error of discrimination during the selection of the
grand jury, which necessarily occurs before, not "during," the "presentation of the case to the [pet-
it] jury." Id. But each of the other errors the Court saw fit to include on Fulminante's list of
structural defects - "total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial," id. at 309, trial before a
judge who is "not impartial," id., and violations of "the right[s] to self-representation at trial" and
to a "public trial," id. at 310 - often occur during the trial or, more particularly, "during the
presentation of the case to the jury," id. at 307.
101 The assertion that trial errors are quantitatively assessable must mean something along the
lines that the impact of these errors on trial outcomes is "susceptible of measurement,"
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1013 (2d college ed. 1985) (definition i.b for quantitative),
to the degree necessary for reviewing courts to determine whether they are "harmless beyond a
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number of cases, such as cases in which the untainted evidence against
the defendant was so overwhelming that the outcome was all but inev-
itable regardless of any error.1 0 2 The Court's own list of paradigmatic
structural defects in Fulminante thus belies the notion that trial errors
and structural defects represent opposite poles of a binary system.
Although Fulminante's conceptual scheme is "baffling and mostly
unhelpful,"1 0 3  courts have remained consistent since Fulminante, as
reasonable doubt" under the Chapman standard, Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308. Insofar as the
Court meant to go further than this and suggest that harmless error review for trial errors is a
"mathematical operation" that aims to calculate the error's effect in the form of an "exact amount
or number," AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra, at 1013 (definitions 3 and I.c, respec-
tively, for quantity), such a formulaic conception of harmless error analysis would be at odds with
the Court's recognition in Kotteakos and elsewhere that "the discrimination [the federal harmless
error statute] requires is one of judgment transcending confinement by formula or precise rule,"
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946) ("Judgment, the play of impression and con-
viction along with intelligence, varies with judges and also with circumstance.").
102 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308. The four structural defects listed in Fulminante that I believe
can be "quantitatively assessed," id., in appropriate cases to determine their effect on the outcome
are discriminatory grand jury selection, trial by a judge who is not impartial, and errors involving
the rights to self-representation and to a public trial. Indeed, it is arguably easier for a reviewing
court to discern the impact of these so-called structural defects than to measure the effect of cer-
tain trial errors. Discriminatory selection of the grand jury is perhaps the clearest example, at
least when reviewed in a posttrial posture. Once the petit jury has returned a guilty verdict upon
finding proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that verdict is powerful evidence that, even if no error
had occurred during the grand jury phase, the grand jury likewise would have found the prosecu-
tion's evidence sufficient to indict under the far less demanding probable cause standard. See
United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 67 (1986) (making this point with respect to violations of
Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
Structural errors involving the "total deprivation of a the right to counsel at trial,"
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309, pose special problems. On the one hand, it is possible that in some
cases courts can discern the effect of total right-to-counsel errors on the outcome where the evi-
dence against the defendant overwhelmingly established both that she committed the crime and
that no plausible affirmative defense was available to her. Such cases are exceedingly rare, how-
ever, because the prosecution's evidence often appears unchallengeable before it has been tested
but becomes far weaker when defense counsel subjects it to scrutiny. And when the error not on-
ly taints the trial but reaches back into the pretrial phase as well, it is "virtually impossible" for a
court to measure the effect counsel might have had on the defendant's "options, tactics, and deci-
sions in plea negotiations" had the error not occurred. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 491
(1978); see id. at 490-91 (discussing the inability of courts to assess the likely impact of attorney
conflicts of interest on case outcomes).
103 Edwards, supra note ro, at 1207. To mention just a few of the many judges and commenta-
tors who have forcefully challenged Fulminante's conceptual framework, see, for example,
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 290-91 (White, J., dissenting); McCord, supra note 31, at 1401; Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., The Supreme Court, ipo Term - Comment: Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of
Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, I6I-65 (1991); Kendra
Oyer, Comment, Classifying Constructive Amendment as Trial or Structural Error, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 6og, 613-20 (20IO). No one has attempted in any systematic way to defend the tri-
al/structural-error conceptual framework against these and other attacks on its coherence.
Kendra Oyer has cogently argued that "[s]hort of overruling Fulminante, the best way to recon-
cile" its disparate descriptions of the concept of structural error "is to view each one as isolating a
cluster of recurring features - family resemblances - that some but not all structural errors
share" rather than as "necessary" or "sufficient" conditions. Oyer, supra, at 622. Oyer rightly
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they were before it, in their general aversion to creating new automat-
ic-reversal rules or enforcing old ones. Troubled by the "risk that a
sometimes-harmless error will be classified as structural, thus resulting
in the reversal of criminal convictions obtained pursuant to a fair tri-
al, '"104 courts have embraced a "strong presumption" against automatic
reversao1 0 5 and have deviated from that presumption "only in a 'very
limited class of cases.'o1 0 6 And it appears that courts often circumvent
even what few automatic-reversal rules they have recognized through
a process known as "remedial deterrence"1 07 - holding, for example,
that certain partial or temporary courtroom closures, though legally
improper, are "too trivial" to violate the Sixth Amendment right to a
public trial and thus do not require automatic reversal.1 08 The upshot
is that automatic reversal is potentially available only in rare and iso-
lated niches of criminal procedure and that, in the great majority of
cases, defendants who wish to obtain reversal must articulate their
claims within the paramaters of the applicable result-based harmless
error rule if they are to prevail.
II. CONTEXTUAL HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW
A. Preliminary Sketch
This Part sketches an alternative method of harmless error analy-
sis, called contextual harmless error review, which has two essential
features. First, it assesses harm in relation to the constellation of in-
acknowledges, though, that this attempt at rationalizing the Court's decisions runs counter to
Fulminante's apparent assumption that "its various descriptions ... define the same, unitary con-
cept." Id. at 621.
104 Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3 d 1134, 1138 (4 th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
105 Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986).
106 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (ggg) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,
468 (1997)).
107 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 884-85 (1999) (emphasis omitted) ("[T]he right may be shaped by the nature of the remedy
that will follow if the right is violated. . . . Call this straightforward relationship between right
and remedy remedial deterrence. The defining feature is the threat of undesirable reme-
dial consequences motivating courts to construct the right in such a way as to avoid those
consequences.").
108 Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3 d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Kristin Saetveit, Note, Close
Calls: Defining Courtroom Closures Under the Sixth Amendment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 897 (2016)
(arguing that Peterson and comparable decisions by other courts represent an effort to "surrepti-
tiously redefine[]," id. at 902, the right to a public trial in reaction to the rule that unconstitutional
courtroom closures require automatic reversal, id. at 901-02). Some commentators likewise be-
lieve that courts reviewing Batson claims have "strained not to find a violation in the first place,"
Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001,
2005 (1998), out of frustration at their inability to "calibrate the remedy" of automatic reversal, id.
at 2015. See generally Shepard, supra note 30, at 1188 (arguing that courts have "narrowed the
definition of the error" for "all ... errors to which the rule of automatic reversal applies").
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terests served by the particular procedural rule that was infringed.
And second, it makes reversal available if the redressable harm that
the error caused to those interests is substantial enough to justify
reversal.
The defining characteristic of contextual harmless error review, and
the one that sets it apart most starkly from result-based harmless error
review, is that it focuses on the interest(s) protected by the infringed
procedural rule. The inquiry's focus will often change from case to
case for the simple reason that the normative priorities of criminal
procedure likewise vary a great deal from one rule to the next. To be
sure, in some circumstances - in particular, where the infringed rule
exists solely to protect truth-furthering interests - contextual harmless
error analysis would produce the same outcome, and would do so for
substantially the same reasons, as result-based harmless error re-
view.109 But the two methods of harmless error review would diverge
analytically, potentially yielding different remedial dispositions, when
applied to rules that safeguard non-truth-furthering interests instead of
(or in addition to) truth-furthering interests.
Courts often downplay or obscure criminal procedure's normative
complexity when attempting to rationalize their embrace of result-
based harmless error rules. In Rose v. Clark,110 for instance, the
Supreme Court asserted - to support its holding that there is a
"strong presumption" that the Chapman harmless error rule applies to
most constitutional errors - that the overall normative "thrust" of
criminal procedure is to maximize the accuracy of the adjudicative
process.' Because contextual and result-based harmless error review
would operate in much the same way with respect to truth-furthering
interests, Rose's reductive characterization of criminal procedure
would be fatal to my proposal if that characterization were correct.
But the Rose decision is wrong about this, for criminal procedure is
replete with not only "truth-furthering" rights, but "truth-obstructing"
and "truth-neutral" ones as well. 1 1 2  Perhaps the clearest and most
109 It bears note that the correct-result approach to harmless error review, as described in sec-
tion L.A, see supra pp. 1802-04, and long ago rejected by American courts, would be a theoretical-
ly appropriate method of analysis with respect to truth-furthering interests. Because errors by
definition do not compromise truth-furthering interests unless they further an outcome that does
not reflect the truth (for example, a wrongful conviction), the correct-result test might ask the
right question by focusing directly on the correctness of the outcome. I put this possibility to one
side, however, both because it raises complex concerns beyond the scope of this Article and be-
cause it would divert me from my main purpose, which is to explore how harmless error review
might be reformed so as to take into account and better vindicate non-truth-furthering (and re-
sult-independent) interests.
110 478 U.S. 570 (ig86).
III Id. at 579.
112 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at Iogi; see id. at IOgl-94; Stacy & Dayton, supra note 13,
at 89.
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consequential example of a truth-obstructing right in criminal proce-
dure is the Fourth Amendment, which requires the exclusion of
reliable evidence as a means of protecting privacy.1 1 3  Another impact-
ful rule that often operates in a truth-obstructing manner is the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, which excludes confessions that are
sometimes reliable (and other times not1 1 4 ) out of "respect for the in-
violability of the human personality." 1 5  These two rules account for
such a disproportionate share of the procedural issues litigated in crim-
inal cases that Professor William Stuntz was perhaps not far from the
truth when he remarked that "[a] great many criminal procedure
claims . .. correlate (if at all) only very slightly with strong claims on
the merits." 1 6
Many other rules in criminal procedure are similarly designed at
least in part to advance non-truth-furthering interests, often in con-
junction with truth-furthering interests."' The functions of the right
to a jury trial, for instance, include "impress[ing] upon the criminal de-
fendant and the community as a whole that a verdict of conviction or
acquittal is given in accordance with the law by persons who are
fair." 1 The rules that comprise the "right to a full defense" arguably
serve "participatory or dignitary function[s]" by allowing a defendant
to "have his voice heard in the proceedings in which his fate is decid-
ed, even if he has no reasonable chance of swaying a jury."119 Rules
prohibiting invidious discrimination during selection of both grand1 2 0
113 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976).
114 See generally Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1051 (20IO) (identifying some shared characteristics and apparent causes of known false confes-
sions, but acknowledging that "we [do] not know how often confession contamination occurs," id.
at 1117).
115 E.g., Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) ("[T]he Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of
truth."). For a revisionist take on the function of the Fifth Amendment privilege, see Akhil Reed
Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93
MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995) (arguing that the need to guard against unreliable confessions furnishes
the "best reason" for the privilege, id. at 859).
116 William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Jus-
tice, 107 YALE L.J. I, 46-47 (1997).
117 Professors Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton helpfully note that some rights "have mixed pur-
poses: they seek not only to foster the reliability of the fact-finding process, but also to promote
other truth-neutral values such as participation or fair play." Stacy & Dayton, supra note 13, at
89.
118 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (199)-
119 Stacy & Dayton, supra note 13, at II2; accord, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 8o6, 834
(1975). But cf, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (stating that, although the right to
confront adverse witnesses serves "symbolic goals" by enabling "the accused and accuser [to] en-
gage in an open and even contest in a public trial," the right "primarily" aims to "promote reliabil-
ity in criminal trials").
120 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 n.3 (1986).
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and petit1 2 1 jurors, and rules governing the presentation of evidence
and argument at trial, 1 2 2 both aim to prevent a "mix of stigmatic,
participational, and fairness harms to defendants, excluded jurors, and
the community." 1 2 3  And rules that forbid prosecutors from breaking
promises made in plea deals rest "upon a policy interest in establishing
the trust between defendants and prosecutors that is necessary to sus-
tain plea bargaining." 1 2 4
These illustrations, which offer just a small snapshot of the full
range of interests that underpin the law of criminal procedure, belie
the notion that the pursuit of truth - or any other single value -
constitutes criminal procedure's overarching "thrust." 1 2 5 The preoccu-
pation of existing harmless error rules with an error's effect on out-
comes thus is not, as Rose and other cases1 2 6 suggest, a natural reflec-
tion or logical implication of the normative structure of criminal
procedure. To the contrary, the monistic and result-based conception
of harm that undergirds the modern harmless error doctrine seems
profoundly misaligned with the eclectic normative objectives of crimi-
nal procedure. The alternative I propose, by contrast, would adjust
the metric of harm in each case to reflect the purpose of the rule that
was infringed. By doing so, my approach would better reflect the di-
verse norms of criminal procedure and comply with the principle that
"[tihe nature of [the] available remedy is . . . tied to the substantive
right at issue." 1 2 7
121 See, e.g., Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986).
122 See, e.g., State v. Monday, 257 P 3d 551, 557-58 (Wash. 2011) (en banc).
123 Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the
Sixth Amendment, r06 YALE L.J. 93, rig (1996) (making this point in the context of describing
Batson jurisprudence).
124 Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, I4I (2009).
125 Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986).
126 E.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) ("The harmless-error doctrine recog-
nizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of
the defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focus-
ing on the underlying fairness of the trial . . . ." (citation omitted)). While there can be no serious
dispute regarding the existence - indeed, even the pervasiveness - of rules in criminal proce-
dure that serve non-truth-furthering interests, there is some controversy regarding whether and
under what circumstances reversal can meaningfully redress the harm error has caused to those
interests. See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 13 (conceding that the issue of redressability is more
complex for harm involving non-truth-furthering interests, see id. at 94, but arguing that reversal
sometimes can redress harm to non-truth-furthering interests, see id., as, for example, when denial
of the defendant's right of self-representation at trial deprives her of autonomy that can be re-
stored by providing a retrial in which her right to proceed on her own behalf is honored, see id. at
110-13). Although this Article does not endeavor to sort out the circumstances in which various
non-truth-furthering interests are redressable or not, my definition of contextual harmless error
review accounts for this problem (to the extent it is a problem) by restricting the purview of the
balancing analysis to harms that impinge on redressable interests.
127 FISCHER, supra note 22, § 3.1, at ii.
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B. Contextual Harmless Error Review
for Non-Truth-Furthering Interests
To clarify how contextual harmless error review differs in practical
application from result-based harmless error review, it will help to
complicate criminal procedure's familiar taxonomy of truth-furthering
and non-truth-furthering interests1 28 by distinguishing among two sub-
types of non-truth-furthering interests. A result-correlated interest is
one that, although non-truth-furthering, nevertheless correlates with
the result in the following sense: whenever an error implicating that
interest affects the result adversely to the defendant, that error neces-
sarily also harms the result-correlated interest to a degree substantial
enough to justify reversal; 1 2 9 but whenever the error does not tilt the
result against the defendant, it also will not impair the result-
correlated interest enough to justify reversal. A result-independent
interest, by contrast, is one for which there is no strict correlation be-
tween the degree to which an error harms the result-independent
interest and the likelihood that the error affected the result. For an er-
ror that implicates a result-independent interest, it is certainly possible
that the error could substantially affect both (or neither of) the out-
come and the result-independent interest. But any such correspond-
ence in particular cases between the error's effect on the result and its
impairment of the result-independent interest would happen through
sheer coincidence and not due to any causal link or broader pattern.
By introducing these concepts, I do not mean to suggest that non-
truth-furthering interests in reality fit completely within one class or
the other. To the contrary, I have defined both categories in such ex-
treme terms that they are unlikely to fully describe many (or any) ac-
tual interests.
Still, they serve a valuable heuristic function. Non-truth-furthering
interests often lean toward one pole of the dichotomy or the other, and
the direction and extent of that leaning for any particular interest
largely determines whether result-based harmless error review can ad-
equately protect that interest. Non-truth-furthering interests that are
result independent cannot obtain reliable redress under a result-based
harmless error regime, but result-correlated interests can - as long as
we assume, as I do for the sake of argument, that result-based harm-
128 See supra section IIA, pp. 1810-14.
129 The definition revolves around "substantial" harm because the distinction between substan-
tial and insubstantial harm is essential to any method of harmless error review, contextual or oth-
erwise. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2012) ("On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any
case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or
defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."). Although it may be worthwhile
to explore other means (such as civil damages) of redressing harm that does not rise to the level
needed to warrant reversal, that goal is not the point of harmless error rules.
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less error review can reliably detect when an outcome-determinative
error has occurred.1 3 0  Several illustrations will help clarify the mean-
ing of these concepts and show why they are important.
Consider, first, two gun-possession cases in which the trial court er-
roneously admitted evidence of a gun obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. In the first, police found the gun (illegally) in the
defendant's coat pocket, and that gun was the prosecution's sole evi-
dence of guilt. In the second, police found not just one gun, but three.
This time, they lawfully searched the defendant's coat pocket, finding
a gun there, and while doing so spotted another gun in plain view
right beside him The only unlawful police conduct stemmed from a
search of the defendant's car that occurred later (according to the po-
lice, at least1 3 1), through which they found a gun that possibly be-
longed to the defendant, but probably belonged to his brother or sister,
who were borrowing the car at the time.
The error in each of these hypotheticals implicates a non-truth-
furthering interest that is heavily result-correlated. The interest pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, as presently con-
ceived of by the Supreme Court, is non-truth-furthering in the sense
that it is concerned with privacy rather than with enhancing the reli-
ability of factfinding in criminal trials. 1 3 2 And that interest is substan-
tially result-correlated in that the mechanism through which the exclu-
sionary rule protects privacy (if, in fact, it does) is by diminishing the
government's incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment in future
cases as a means of obtaining evidence that will lead to convictions. 133
Errors cause harm to that interest only to the degree that they enhance
the probability of conviction.
130 Existing discussions of harmless error review overlook this point insofar as they suggest that
result-based harmless error review is inappropriate with respect to all non-truth-furthering inter-
ests. See, e.g., Stacy & Dayton, supra note 13.
131 For anyone curious about the rest of the (hypothetical) backstory to this case, here's the
scoop: Strong evidence indicated that the police initially suspected, but as of yet could not prove,
that the defendant was a drug dealer. Based on the unreliable tip of an anonymous informant
who said that drugs were in his car, they searched it. The police later searched the defendant's
person only because they had already found a gun in the car. Had the trial court credited this
evidence, the exclusionary rule would have required suppression of all three guns as "fruits" of the
illegal initial search. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963). Perhaps recog-
nizing this risk, the police claimed that they searched the defendant first - based on seeing him
make furtive gestures in his waistband area suggesting that a gun might be there - and later
searched his car only after finding the guns on or near him. The trial court bought the officers'
story. Cf. Julia Simon-Kerr, Systemic Lying, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2175, 220I-06 (2015) (cit-
ing studies suggesting that "testilying" is "routine" in Fourth Amendment suppression hearings
and that it depends on the "cooperation of prosecutors, police officers, and judges who are willing
to ignore obvious falsehoods in the courtroom," id. at 2202).
132 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
133 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 456, 486 (1976).
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In both hypotheticals, contextual and result-based harmless error
review should, if applied correctly, produce the same outcomes on ap-
peal, albeit for somewhat different reasons.
An appellate court applying contextual harmless error review
would begin by identifying the interest (here, privacy) served by the
infringed procedural rule (here, the exclusionary rule). It would then
examine whether the error substantially harmed that interest. In the
first case, the answer to that question is yes, so the court would re-
verse: because the sole evidence of guilt was admitted in error, the er-
ror handed the prosecution a conviction it could not otherwise have
obtained and thereby substantially impaired the exclusionary rule's
goal of depriving the government of its ill-gotten gains as a means of
disincentivizing future privacy violations. But in the second case, the
answer is no, and the court would affirm: the error merely enabled the
government to introduce evidence of a third gun that was only tenu-
ously connected to the defendant when it already had evidence of two
other guns, found on or near his person, that all but ensured his con-
viction. Because the error in the second scenario did not substantially
increase the probability that the defendant would be convicted, which
was already a near certainty, the error also - and for the same rea-
son - did not substantially enhance the government's incentive to
violate the Fourth Amendment during future investigations in the
hope of gaining more convictions.
A court applying result-based harmless error review would reach
these same conclusions, and it would take fewer analytical steps in do-
ing so. Without first identifying the interest protected by the underly-
ing procedural rule, the court would immediately turn to the question
of whether the error affected the result. 1 3 4 And for the reasons out-
lined above, the court would reverse in the first hypothetical and af-
firm in the second.
Generalizing from these examples, contextual and result-based
harmless error review would reach the same outcome, though on dif-
ferent grounds, in any case where the non-truth-furthering interests
implicated by the error are result-correlated. To be clear, neither
harmless error method expressly takes into consideration the fact that
the interests are result-correlated. Contextual harmless error review
concerns itself only with whether the error substantially harmed the
relevant interests whereas result-based harmless error review focuses
solely on whether the error affected the result. But whenever non-
truth-furthering interests are result-correlated in the sense I use that
term, substantial harm to those interests necessarily goes together, or
134 See supra notes 40-5 1 and accompanying text (summarizing the most common variations of
result-based harmless error review).
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"correlates," with an effect on the result, producing identical outcomes
under both harmless error methods despite their discordant analytical
foci.
Not so for result-independent interests. To explain why, I use a hy-
pothetical from a different area of law based on the facts in Neill v.
Gibson,1 3 5 with a few variations noted below. Jay Neill and Grady
Johnson were gay lovers who plotted an armed bank robbery, which
Neill then carried out, committing several gruesome murders in the
process. Neill did not dispute committing the murders during the guilt
phase of his Oklahoma death-penalty trial. But he did present miti-
gating evidence during the trial's penalty phase, arguing (among other
things) that he committed the murders out of desperation to save his
failing relationship with Johnson. Purportedly in response to this mit-
igation argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to impose the death
penalty in part because Neill was gay. Trial counsel objected to one of
the prosecutor's homophobic remarks, but the trial court overruled
the objection. The jury gave Neill a death sentence; four of them, in
fact. The state courts affirmed Neill's convictions and sentences,
and the Tenth Circuit did the same. Regarding Neill's prosecutorial-
misconduct claim, the Tenth Circuit ultimately agreed that the prose-
cutor committed misconduct but concluded that, because the prosecu-
tion's evidence of aggravating circumstances was "overwhelming,"
habeas relief was unwarranted. 1 36
Although the prosecutorial-misconduct claim arrived at the Tenth
Circuit beset by procedural complications, I would like to simplify the
hypothetical by placing the misconduct claim back before an interme-
diate Oklahoma state court on direct appeal. My purpose in doing so
is to show how the disposition of Neill's misconduct claim on direct
appeal might come out differently depending on whether the court ap-
plied a contextual or a result-based method of harmless error review.
Here, as in the previous set of hypotheticals, a court applying
contextual harmless error review would begin by identifying the inter-
ests protected by the infringed procedural rules - rules that disallow
arguments and evidence that play upon invidious prejudice. 13 7  One
interest served by those rules is, of course, a truth-furthering interest
135 263 F.3 d 1184 (ioth Cir.), modified on reh'g, 278 F.3 d 1044 (ioth Cir. 2001). For a compre-
hensive study of the Neill case, see Joan W. Howarth, The Geronimo Bank Murders: A Gay Trag-
edy, 17 LAw & SEXUALITY 39 (2008).
136 Neill, 278 F.3 d at 1062; see also id. at 1049-50, 1060-62.
137 The prohibition on invidiously discriminatory argumentation on the part of the prosecution
derives from constitutional requirements, see, e.g., Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017), as
well as nonconstitutional rules of evidence and procedure, see generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Ra-
cial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739 (1993) ("[R]acial imagery may be evaluated
against the various standards for pretrial prejudice, the admissibility of relevant evidence, the lim-
its on proper summations, and so on . . . ." Id. at 1767.).
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in ensuring that the factfinder renders its decision based on evi-
dence rather than accuracy-impairing biases. 1 3  That interest, like all
truth-furthering interests, is perfectly result-correlated. If a bigoted
argument by a prosecutor prompts the jury to convict an innocent de-
fendant, the prosecutor's error completely subverts the rule's truth-
furthering interest. Otherwise - if, for instance, the jury wrongfully
convicts an innocent defendant for reasons wholly unrelated to the
prosecutor's argument, or if the jury properly convicts a guilty defen-
dant - the error has no bearing on the pursuit of truth.
But the promotion of accurate factfinding is not the sole function of
rules forbidding bigoted prosecutorial argument. As the Supreme
Court emphasized in a recent case involving testimony based on racial
stereotypes, discrimination "'poisons public confidence' in the judicial
process"1 3 9 and "thus injures not just the defendant, but 'the law as an
institution, ... the community at large, and ... the democratic ideal
reflected in the processes of our courts."' 1 4 0 These interests, moreover,
correlate with results, if at all, only incidentally and by happenstance,
for it is every bit as much a subversion of nondiscrimination norms for
a prosecutor to make bigoted arguments directed at a plainly guilty de-
fendant as it is when the defendant is innocent.
Contextual harmless error review in a case like Neill, then, requires
a court to examine harm in relation to multiple distinct interests, some
of which are truth-furthering and result-correlated, but some of which
are non-truth-furthering and result-independent. The court's harm
analysis with respect to truth-furthering interests might look similar or
identical to a traditional result-based harmless error analysis, requiring
reversal only if the prosecutor's bigotry swayed the outcome. 1 4 1 The
same cannot be said, however, for the non-truth-furthering, result-
independent interests safeguarded by rules barring discrimination.
Whether or not the prosecutor's remarks might have affected the re-
sult, a court applying contextual harmless error review would need to
separately inquire whether the prosecutor's remarks substantially
harmed the underlying rule's non-truth-furthering objectives. I think
most, though not all, would agree that on the facts of Neill the prose-
cutor's bigoted remarks - uncorrected in any way by the trial court,
which overruled the defense's objection - harmed these interests to a
138 See, e.g., Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 7or, 706-07 (4 th Cir. 1978).
139 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 778 (quoting Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015)).
140 Id. (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)); see also, e.g., State v. Monday, 257
P.3 d 551, 557-58 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) ("[R]esorting to racist arguments is so fundamentally op-
posed to our founding principles, values, and fabric of our justice system that it should not need
to be explained. . . . [l]t fundamentally undermines the principle of equal justice and is so repug-
nant to the concept of an impartial trial its very existence demands that appellate courts set ap-
propriate standards to deter such conduct.").
141 See supra note rog.
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degree that warrants reversal of Neill's death sentences, at least on di-
rect appeal. 1 4 2
Would result-based harmless error review produce the same dispo-
sition as contextual harmless error review here as it did in the exclu-
sionary-rule scenarios? Perhaps so, as suggested by Judge Lucero's
Tenth Circuit dissent in which he challenged the majority's conclusion
that the prosecution's case supporting a death sentence was so over-
whelming that the jury assuredly would have rendered the same ver-
dict absent the error. 1 4 3
But the answer to that question depends strictly on whether the
majority was correct in its view that the evidence against the defen-
dant was so overwhelming as to preclude any realistic possibility of a
different verdict. 1 4 4 For reasons explained in section J.A, the emphasis
on "overwhelming evidence" in Neill is emblematic of a much larger
pattern that pervades the case law on result-based harmless error re-
view. 1 4 5  When reviewing courts find that the prosecution's so-called
142 There is certainly room for disagreement on this point, as is often the case with respect to
remedial rules like the one I propose that call for balancing competing interests. Cf. Smith v. Far-
ley, 59 F.3 d 659, 663-64 (7 th Cir. 1995) (denying the defendant's habeas petition, despite remarks
by the prosecutor that improperly characterized a black witness's testimony as "shucking and jiv-
ing" and compared the black defendant to "super-fly," and explaining that "[t]he cost in judicial
and prosecutorial resources that would be consumed in retrials designed to vindicate an abstract
principle . . . has been thought too high," id. at 664). See generally Shana Heller, Dehumanization
and Implicit Bias: Why Courts Should Preclude References to Animal Imagery in Criminal Trials,
51 CRIM. L. BULL. 870 (2015) ("The numbers of cases where courts have failed to overturn con-
victions in the face of prosecutorial misconduct based on racial bias vastly outnumber the cases
where convictions have been reversed." Id. at 882.). On balance, though, I would reverse under
the circumstances presented in Neill based on the belief that "[t]he costs of prosecutorial appeals
to race and or gender bias are enormous" and that "failure to address this sort of prosecutorial
misconduct will allow confidence in the criminal justice system to continue to erode." Andrea D.
Lyon, Setting the Record Straight: A Proposal for Handling Prosecutorial Appeals to Racial, Eth-
nic or Gender Prejudice During Trial, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 319, 338 (2001); accord, e.g.,
Calhoun v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1136, 1137-38 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari) (criticizing a prosecutor's "attempt to substitute racial stereotype for evidence," id. at
1137, and noting that "[s]uch conduct diminishes the dignity of our criminal justice system and
undermines respect for the rule of law," id. at 1138).
143 Neill v. Gibson, 263 F.3 d 1184 (ioth Cir.), modified on reh'g, 278 F.3 d 1044 (ioth Cir. 2001)
(Lucero, J., dissenting).
144 See, e.g., Smith, 59 F.3 d at 663-64 ("The cases hold that one or two isolated references to
race or ethnicity, wholly unlikely to sway a jury, do not compel a new trial on federal constitu-
tional grounds when the defendant's guilt is established by overwhelming evidence." Id. at 664.).
145 See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. r, 16-19 ('999); United States v. Hasting, 461
U.S. 499, 511-12 (1983); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973); Milton v. Wainwright,
407 U.S. 371, 372-73, 377-78 (1972); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430-32 (1972); Harrington
v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619-20 (1953);
Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 475-76 (1900); Gregg v. Moss, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 564, 569
(1871); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935); Wilson v. United States, 149
U.S. 6o, 70 (1893). See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 854 ("Perhaps the single most
significant factor in weighing whether an error was harmful, although not the only one, is the
strength of the case against the defendant.").
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untainted evidence against a defendant is overwhelming, they presume
that the factfinder would have convicted in an error-free trial on the
strength of the untainted evidence alone and thus that the error at is-
sue did not affect the result. 1 4 6  Relying on this logic, courts are pre-
pared to disregard almost any error, even those that gravely compro-
mise the fairness of the proceeding, so long as they are convinced that
overwhelming untainted evidence supports the result reached. As
a consequence, result-based harmless error review bears the potential
to systematically deprive redress for result-independent, non-truth-
furthering interests in cases where the evidence of guilt is
overwhelming.
C. A Prototype
Although much of the caselaw concerning harmless error review is
inhospitable terrain for the non-result-based mode of analysis I am
proposing,147 there is one procedural rule - a judge's duty to recuse
herself under circumstances where a reasonable person could question
her impartiality - for which the Supreme Court and many other
courts have developed a "special harmless error test" that is not pri-
marily result focused. 148 Due to its uniqueness and potential signifi-
cance as precedent for my proposal, this test merits a detailed sum-
mary in this section.
The leading case is Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition
Corp.1 4 9 There, the Supreme Court determined that the trial judge vi-
olated his obligation under 28 U.S.C. 455 § (a) to "disqualify himself in
[a] proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned" due to a conflict of interest1o but noted that this conclusion
"does not . . . end our inquiry" because, "[a]s in other areas of the law,
there is surely room for harmless error."15 1 The Court stated that, be-
146 See sources cited supra note 145; see also supra note 52.
147 See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text (describing variation among the current re-
sult-based harmless error rules).
148 See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745, 746-47 (D.C. 1989) (en banc) (adopting the
harmless error test set forth in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988),
to determine when reversal is the appropriate remedy for a trial judge's failure to "disqualify him-
self in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned," Scott, 559 A.2d at
747 (quoting CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(I) (Am. BAR Ass'N 1972))).
149 486 U.S. 847.
150 Id. at 858 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012)); see also id. at 858-61. The conflict of interest
stemmed from the fact that the trial judge was a member of the Board of Trustees of Loyola
University, which, at the time of trial, was negotiating a real-estate transaction with Liljeberg (the
defendant), and the "benefit to Loyola of these negotiations turned, in large part, on Liljeberg
prevailing in the litigation." Id. at 850.
151 Id. at 862 ("[T]here is surely room for harmless error committed by busy judges who inad-
vertently overlook a disqualifying circumstance. There need not be a draconian remedy for every
violation of § 455(a). It would be equally wrong, however, to adopt an absolute prohibition
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cause § 455(a) "neither prescribes nor prohibits any particular remedy
for a violation," Congress had "delegated to the judiciary the task of
fashioning the remedies that will best serve the purpose of the legisla-
tion." 1 5 2 Recognizing that the "purpose of § 455(a) is to promote confi-
dence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of improprie-
ty," the Court deemed it "critically important in a case of this kind to
identify the facts that might reasonably cause an objective observer to
question [the trial judge's] impartiality."1 5 3 The Court thus formulated
the following test:
[I]n determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a violation of
§ 455(a), it is appropriate to consider [i] the risk of injustice to the parties
in the particular case, [2] the risk that the denial of relief will produce in-
justice in other cases, and [3] the risk of undermining the public's confi-
dence in the judicial process. 15 4
The Supreme Court then applied these factors and held that the Fifth
Circuit had correctly vacated the trial court's judgment. 155
The Supreme Court's analysis in Liljeberg - which has been wide-
ly, though not universally, applied by other courts with respect to
recusal errors comparable to violations of § 455(a) 1 5 6 - exemplifies
key elements of the harmless error method I have outlined.
against any relief in cases involving forgetful judges." (footnote omitted)). One dissenting judge
has argued, by contrast, that the Supreme Court's single mention of "harmless error" in Liljeberg
does not refer to the harmless error doctrine. See United States v. O'Keefe, 169 F.3d 281, 285-89
(5th Cir. 1999) (Dennis, J., dissenting from order granting United States' motion for temporary
stay pending appeal). In Judge Dennis's view, "Liljeberg does not create a special harmless error
test at all" but merely outlines "appropriate equitable considerations" for courts to consider in civ-
il, but not criminal, cases when "determining whether a party should be relieved of a final civil
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6o(b)(6)." Id. at 285. But all other judges who have considered
this issue understand Liljeberg as crafting a "harmless error analysis" for violations of § 455(a).
See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 672 F.3 d 1283, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Based on that un-
derstanding, most courts (to the extent they have addressed the matter) have applied Liljeberg's
remedial analysis, in civil and criminal cases alike, with respect to violations of both § 455(a), see,
e.g., United States v. O'Keefe, 128 F.3 d 885, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1gg7), and comparable state rules,
see, e.g., Tierney v. Four H Land Co., 798 N.W.2d 586, 596 (Neb. 2011).
152 Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 862.
153 Id. at 865.
154 Id. at 864.
155 Id. at 85o, 870.
156 Compare, e.g., Tierney, 798 N.W.2d at 596 (adopting Liljeberg for "determining when the
rulings of a judge, who should have recused himself or herself, will be vacated"), with Tennant v.
Marion Health Care Found., Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 387 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that, although "a
breach of our disqualification standards calls into question the judicial process," the "plain lan-
guage of our harmless error rules" requires that "evidence of actual bias or prejudice must be
presented" to obtain a new trial (internal quotation marks omitted)), and Blaisdell v. City of
Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 391 (N.H. 1992) (noting that "[w]e are not bound by Liljeberg" and
"declin[ing] to implement a harmless error test when evaluating violations of the code by the
members of the New Hampshire bench").
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As a court employing contextual harmless error review would do,
the Supreme Court began by acknowledging that it needed to identify
the interests protected by the infringed rule so that it could "fashion[]
the remedies that will best serve the purpose of the legislation."1 57
Having identified the relevant interests - summed up in the proposi-
tion that "the administration of justice should reasonably appear to be
disinterested as well as be so in fact"1 5  - the Court indicated that
those interests should serve as the "guiding consideration"1 5 9 of the
remedial inquiry
In laying out its three-factor test, the Court directed reviewing
courts to focus their balancing inquiry on factors that, again, track the
interests reflected in § 455(a).160  One of these factors, "the risk of in-
justice to the parties in the particular case," 16 1 is result related1 6 2
and appropriately so, for one aim of § 455(a) is the truth-furthering
goal of ensuring that justice should be "disinterested" not just in ap-
pearance but also "in fact."1 6 3  Yet the other two factors do not relate
to the effect of the error on the outcome of the case under review but
instead to deterring future infractions ("the risk that the denial of relief
will produce injustice in other cases" 1 6 4 ) and shoring up judicial legit-
imacy ("the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial
process" 165 ), giving effect to the other, non-truth-furthering policy
157 Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 862.
158 Id. at 869-7o (quoting Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., opinion in chambers)); see also id. at 867 (concluding that several facts "create precisely the
kind of appearance of impropriety that § 455(a) was intended to prevent"); id. at 864 (emphasiz-
ing, right after announcing the three-factor test, that "[w]e must continuously bear in mind that
'to perform its high function in the best way "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice""'
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1995) (citation omitted))).
159 Id. at 869 (quoting Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 343 U.S. at 467 (Frankfurter, J., opinion in
chambers)).
160 Compare id. at 864 (articulating the three-factor test), with id. at 865 ("The very purpose of
§ 455(a) is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of improprie-
ty . . . ."). By instructing courts to focus their remedial analysis on these factors without making
any particular factor a necessary or sufficient condition for reversal, Liljeberg suggests that courts
should weigh them (potentially alongside other relevant interests) in a "balancing" process. Powell
v. Anderson, 66o N.W.2d 1o7, 121 (Minn. 2003) (adopting the Liljeberg test and stating that it in-
volves "balancing" interests relating to the fairness of the trial and the appearance of justice
"against the potential burdens placed on the judicial system and the parties by reopening a final
judgment").
161 Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864.
162 In applying this factor the Supreme Court emphasized, among other things, that "a careful
study of [the nonrecusing judge's] analysis of the merits of the underlying litigation suggests that
there is a greater risk of unfairness in upholding the judgment in favor of Liljeberg than there is
in allowing a new judge to take a fresh look." Id. at 868.
163 Id. at 870 (quoting Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 343 U.S. at 467 (Frankfurter, J., opinion in
chambers)).
164 Id. at 864.
165 Id
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§ 455(a) is designed to promote - "that the administration of justice
should reasonably appear to be disinterested."1 6 6
Why have many courts deviated so strikingly from their usual re-
sult-based harmless error rules - and endorsed a harmless error
method that bears much closer resemblance to contextual harmless er-
ror review - in this context? The Liljeberg opinion does not explain
this anomaly, nor even address it. Other courts have tried to do so,
explaining that it would be "inconsistent" with the non-truth-
furthering objective of the infringed recusal rule if courts were to con-
dition relief on "a review of the record for actual prejudice under the
traditional harmless error standard."1 67 The point is a fair one. But it
cannot be more than a partial explanation, for as we have seen, the
same could be said of numerous other rules in criminal procedure that
protect non-truth-furthering interests ignored by result-based harmless
error review.168  Regardless of what the full reason might be, 169
Liljeberg and its progeny might suggest the sorts of rules that arise
when a court appreciates that a procedural rule serves important non-
truth-furthering objectives that are "inconsistent" 17 0 with the narrow
purview of result-based harmless error review. If courts could be per-
suaded that other procedural rules, like recusal rules, serve compara-
ble objectives, then perhaps they could likewise be persuaded to fash-
ion contextually appropriate harmless error standards better suited to
the remedial needs of those rules.
CONCLUSION
I recognize that stare decisis may prove to be a formidable obstacle
to harmless error reform of the kind proposed in this Article. Apart
from the "special harmless error test"' that applies to errors involving
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and comparable state statutes, 17 2 decades of "settled
precedent"1 3 in both federal and state courts arguably establish result-
166 Id. at 869-70 (quoting Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 343 U.S. at 467 (Frankfurter, J., opinion in
chambers)).
167 Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745, 750 (D.C. 1989) (en banc).
168 See supra section I.B, pp. 1814-20.
169 One hypothesis is that reviewing courts, protective of their own legitimacy and sensitive to
threats to that legitimacy, have a better understanding of - or simply care more about - the
non-truth-furthering interests jeopardized by judicial bias (or its appearance) than other kinds of
non-truth-furthering interests. Cf Alschuler, supra note 13, at 685-93 (finding that reviewing
courts approach judicial-misconduct claims "in a different spirit from that which typifies their
opinions in cases of prosecutorial misconduct," id. at 687, and that "courts have demonstrated
their extreme reluctance to hold courtroom misconduct by trial judges nonprejudicial," id. at 689).
170 Scott, 559 A.2d at 750.
171 Id. at 747.
172 See supra section IIC, pp. 1820-23.
173 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999) (referring to the general rule that reversal de-
pends on "the effect of the error upon the verdict").
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based harmless error review (or, in rare situations, automatic rever-
sal17 4 ) as the law of the land. Many of these decisions embracing
result-based harmless error review purport to construe applicable stat-
utes,17 5 potentially implicating the principle that "stare decisis weigh[s]
heavily in the area of statutory construction."' 6  At first blush, then,
the goal of fostering "evenhanded, predictable, and consistent devel-
opment of legal principles"17 might appear to militate against adop-
tion of contextual harmless error review by the courts without prior
legislative authorization. And legislative fixes to harmless error review
are probably not in the cards, given the tendency of Congress and state
legislatures to delegate the task of operationalizing harmless error rules
to the judiciary through a combination of inactivity and vaguely
phrased statutes.178
But these concerns may be surmountable. Textual considerations
do not compel courts to employ a result-based method of harmless er-
ror analysis, as most harmless error rules use ambiguous terms (typi-
cally, whether the error "affect[ed] . . . substantial rights"1 79 ), leaving
courts with broad discretion to work out the details. 1 0 The very same
174 See supra section I.B, pp. 1805-10.
175 See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762-65 (1946) (construing the precursor
to the general federal harmless error statute). The roots of the Chapman harmless error standard
are harder to pinpoint. Some cases and commentators suggest that Chapman is best understood
as an application of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Neder, 527 U.S. at
7, or of 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2012), see TRAYNOR, supra note 42, at 41-42. Others reject this inter-
pretation, I think correctly, for the simple reason that Chapman imposed the harmless error rule it
announced on state courts, to which neither § 2111 nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
apply, and not just on federal courts. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 7, at 19-20. Most commenta-
tors believe that the justification for the Chapman rule, if there is one, must involve the logic of
either constitutional necessity, see, e.g., Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1912-18 (2014), or "constitutional common law," Meltzer, supra note 7, at
26-29. See generally Henry P Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreword: Constitu-
tional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. I (1975) (defining constitutional common law as "a sub-
structure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority
from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions," id. at 2-3).
176 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009) (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,
736 (1977)). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1361 (1988) (describing, and criticizing, the "hierarchy of stare decisis" under which
"[s]tatutory precedents ... enjoy a super-strong presumption of correctness," id. at 1362). One
reason why courts are especially reluctant to overrule statutory precedents is that, unlike when
courts establish erroneous constitutional precedents, legislatures "remain[] free to alter" judicial
interpretations of statutes. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989); id. at
172-73.
177 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
178 See supra notes 64-66, 152 and accompanying text.
179 28 U.S.C. § 2111.
180 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P ii advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendments ("Subdivi-
sion (h) makes clear that the harmless error rule of Rule 52(a) is applicable to Rule ii. The provi-
sion does not, however, attempt to define the meaning of 'harmless error,' which is left to the case
law.").
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pattern of legislative deference that renders statutory harmless error
reform improbable also makes the case for adhering to precedent less
convincing, for "[r]evisiting precedent is particularly appropriate
where . . . the precedent consists of a judge-made rule."' 1 There are
reasons to worry, moreover, that courts' embrace of the result-based
approach to harmless error review was an unwise, and not entirely
self-aware, 18 2 exercise of their discretion to specify the mechanics of
harmless error analysis. According to most commentators who have
studied judicial implementation of result-based harmless error rules,
courts have proven incapable of applying those rules in a reliable, con-
sistent, or efficient manner.18 3  Perhaps these problems are severe
enough that courts should consider abandoning the result-based meth-
od of harmless error analysis as "unworkable."1 8 4
One might also argue that the traditional result-based tests for
harmless error review fail to explain much of what courts actually do
when they decide whether to grant relief to criminal defendants based
on procedural error. It is not easy to discern, for instance, why result-
based harmless error rules authorize courts to consider - as they often
do when purporting to apply those rules - whether an error was in-
tentional or inadvertent, and whether it was an isolated event as op-
posed to a recurring pattern of misconduct.18 5  By rationalizing these
and other anomalous features of criminal procedure's remedial appa-
ratus, a contextual approach to harmless error review might supply a
more "empirically accurate explanation" of not only the "results
181 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 233; see also id. at 233-34 (overruling the so-called order-of-battle rule
announced in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (20cr), reasoning in part that "the Saucier rule is
judge made and implicates an important matter involving internal Judicial Branch operations"
and thus that "[a]ny change should come from this Court, not Congress").
182 I am unaware of any cases in which courts considered whether to adopt a harmless er-
ror approach resembling the one I have proposed and nevertheless chose result-based harm-
less error review as the better rule. Indeed, both of the Supreme Court's most influential harmless
error decisions - Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763-64 (1946), and Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967) - betray deep discomfort with certain ineradicable features of
result-based harmless error review (in particular, the fact that result-based harmless error review
compels courts to excuse just about any imaginable error when the strength of the prosecution's
case is overwhelming) and indicate that the Court has simply been unable to contemplate an al-
ternative, non-result-based methodology.
183 See supra note 13.
184 Cf Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. III, 116 (1965) ("Unless inexorably commanded by
statute, a procedural principle of [significant] importance should not be kept on the books in the
name of stare decisis once it is proved to be unworkable in practice; the mischievous conse
quences to litigants and courts alike from the perpetuation of an unworkable rule are too great.").
One could argue, moreover, that courts should be especially willing to entertain administrability
arguments in this context on the ground that "[s]tare decisis applies much more strongly to rights
than to remedies" because "constitutional theory takes for granted that remedies are expected to
change along with political and policy preferences." Levinson, supra note 1o7, at 935.
185 See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 61g, 638 n.9 (1993).
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[courts] have reached," but also many of the reasons they have given in
support of those results. 6
These reflections are tentative. Replacing result-based harmless er-
ror review with the method sketched in this Article would have far-
reaching consequences, which merit further exploration. Once these
implications are better understood, courts will be in a better position to
know if the time is ripe to abandon the result-based harmless error re-
gime or if, instead, they should prefer the devil they know to the devil
they don't.
186 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 6o n.9 (2004).
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